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Abstract

Do financial crises promote or hamper transatlantic regulatory cooperation in banking? This paper argues that financial crises have an impact upon the alignment of regulatory preferences of the US and the EU, causing an ‘ebb and flow’ in transatlantic cooperation. When EU-US preferences are broadly aligned in periods of financial stability, transatlantic regulatory cooperation is intense. It is relatively easy for the EU and US to agree on market-friendly regulation promoted by banks. When preferences are different, especially in the context and aftermath of the exogenous shock of financial crises, transatlantic cooperation is more problematic because crises re-assert the importance of nationally embedded patterns of market organisation. 
 



Introduction

The United States (US) and the European Union (EU) have very large banking sectors and are the main trading partners in banking services. Thus, transatlantic cooperation is crucial if there is to be any form of effective global governance in banking. According to Ahearns,​[2]​ transatlantic regulatory cooperation can take three main forms: information exchange; mutual recognition,​[3]​ which takes place when two or more jurisdictions agree to recognize each other’s rules in lieu of domestic rules,​[4]​ and regulatory harmonisation,​[5]​ which refers to the establishment of similar (harmonised) rules,​[6]​ mainly through international standard setting.​[7]​

One might intuitively have assumed that following the international financial crisis, transatlantic regulatory cooperation would be reinforced.​[8]​ In practice, however, the record is mixed, as discussed in Section 5. On the one hand, considering the vast amount of new financial legislation adopted after the crisis, the ‘scope’ of US-EU cooperation was considerable and information exchange increased substantially. On the other hand, the 'intensity' of cooperation was weaker in banking, where major transatlantic differences resulting from the structure of the banking systems remain. Hence, there were steps backwards on mutual recognition and the emergence of US-EU regulatory disputes. Moreover, US-EU disagreement became apparent in international regulatory fora as well as in the domestic implementation of internationally agreed rules.

The aim of this paper is to provide some historical context and ask whether there is a repeated pattern (i.e. a common explanation) for these periods of weakened cooperation, which generally seem to follow crises. We contend that transatlantic regulatory cooperation in banking has been subject to ‘ebb and flow’: its overall intensity increased in the late 1990s and early 2000s, only to decline after the international financial crisis. One of the main reasons for this trend may be that economic stability empowers banks and is correlated with a shift to market-friendly policies, which in turn facilitate cooperation. The irony is that this chain of events that contributes to the building up of the next crisis, which results in disempowered banks, the reassertion of the importance of nationally embedded patterns of market organisation. This in turn leads to unilateral national actions, which make cooperation more difficult. 

2. State of the art and explanatory framework

This paper sets out to investigate the intensity and the forms of transatlantic regulatory cooperation in banking — namely information exchange, mutual recognition and international harmonisation — over time. Here the main focus is on the latter two, because information exchange is a very ‘light’ form of cooperation and to a large extent it is a precondition for the other two. The intensity of cooperation is gauged by the extent to which these two jurisdictions agree on the mutual recognition of each other’s rules (or, at the very least, they are willing to grant exemptions) and prevent (or, at least, quickly resolve) cross-border regulatory disputes; and the extent to which they agree (or disagree) in the process of standard-setting in international regulatory fora, followed by the implementation of these agreements domestically.​[9]​

The international political economy literature has so far paid scant attention to transatlantic regulatory cooperation in banking over time.​[10]​ However, there is an extensive literature on international standard setting by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCSB),​[11]​ whereby researchers have examined the negotiations of the so-called Basel I accord in 1989,​[12]​ the Basel II accord in 2005,​[13]​ and the Basel III accord in 2010.​[14]​ A second strand of international political economy literature has examined the bilateral regulatory relations in finance between the US and the EU, albeit not with specific reference to banking, but rather to accounting and securities markets.​[15]​ 

The literature mentioned above postulates that the main rationale for transatlantic cooperation is the attempt by US and EU officials to solve the ‘dilemma’​[16]​ between the need to secure domestic financial stability and protect the competitiveness of their national financial sector in globalised markets. In the banking sector, the dilemma becomes a ‘trilemma’ because banks provide credit to the real economy. Hence, economic growth is the third objective that policy makers seek to secure (or at least not to impinge upon) through banking regulation.​[17]​ In setting the terms for regulatory cooperation, each jurisdiction favours international or bilateral rules that do not pose significant domestic adjustment costs​[18]​ — that is, that do not place the national financial industry at a competitive disadvantage or impose an overhaul of the domestic regulatory framework in place. We expect that whenever US and EU preferences are similar or at least not competing, transatlantic regulatory cooperation will be intense. By contrast, we would expect that whenever US and EU regulatory preferences differ significantly, transatlantic regulatory cooperation will be more problematic and hence less intense. 

But what affects the regulatory preferences of jurisdictions? The literature generally points out the economic interests of banks​[19]​ (which in turn are often linked to the structure of the banking system) ​[20]​ and their lobbying power (which in turn is affected by the types of business–government relations).​[21]​ We follow these insights by providing a first cut explanation of the ‘revealed’ preferences of policy-makers in the main jurisdictions, mainly on the basis of the configuration of national banking systems. Given the long timeframe of the paper and the number of policy episodes examined, space constraints prevent us from engaging in an in-depth analysis of domestic preference formation in the main jurisdictions.

Some authors​[22]​ have qualified the ‘bank power’ argument by pointing out the role of public opinion and the political salience of financial regulation following a financial crisis, whereby this politicization of banking the public antagonism towards bankers and the mobilization of non financial groups to counter the influence of banks reduce the ability of banks to purse their preferences.​[23]​ Indeed, in public policy analysis, crises are often considered as factors triggering major policy changes, including regulatory reforms.​[24]​ Following these insights, we expect that financial crises are likely to trigger less market-friendly policies because politicians and public opinion pay more attention to banking regulation, whereas periods of economic stability are likely to empower banks and are correlated with a shift to market-friendly policies. 

What enable jurisdictions to pursue their regulatory preferences internationally? The existing literature has mostly focused on ‘institutional complementarities’;​[25]​ ‘regulatory capacity’;​[26]​ market size;​[27]​ the ‘cohesiveness’ of a jurisdiction;​[28]​ and the support or opposition from the financial industry.​[29]​ With the exception of Drezner​[30]​ — who explains why the ‘great powers’ prefer different types of international regulatory regimes — less attention has been paid to how different forms of cooperation and the institutional venues through which transatlantic cooperation takes place can affect the ability of the main jurisdictions to pursue their preferences. For example, the US has traditionally had a prominent role in international regulatory fora in finance.​[31]​ By contrast, the EU is by now considered a ‘trade power’,​[32]​ even though the inclusion of financial regulation in trade deals is subject to the so called ‘carve out’. 

We expect that the US and the EU will privilege the forms of cooperation that better enable each of them to pursue (though not necessarily achieve) their preferences, especially if their preferences are not aligned. By contrast, if transatlantic regulatory preferences are aligned, cooperation will be intense in all the main forms. The  main caveat is that  on several occasions, there was not an EU position as such. Hence, our analysis investigates in a concise way the preferences of the main EU member states, even though reference to the EU as a whole is often used as shorthand in the overall discussion.

3. Limited transatlantic regulatory cooperation in banking in the 1980s and early 1990s

In the 1980s and 1990s, the intensity of transatlantic regulatory cooperation was relatively low because the preferences of the US and the EU (as well as within the EU) were not aligned. Indeed, following a series of domestic bank failures, regulation was tightened up in the US and the UK, but not in those continental European countries that avoided major bank failures. Internationally, the US, later joined by the UK, instigated the Basel I accord, which was initially resisted by other European countries that worried about the implications that higher capital requirements would have for the real economy. Bilateral cooperation mainly concerned the terms of access of US and EU banks to each other’s markets on the basis of the principle of national treatment. Hence, transatlantic cooperation came under strains after significant bank failures.

3.1 US-EU (difficult) cooperation on international harmonisation: Basel I

In 1988, the BCBS issued the Basel I accord on ‘International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards’, which set in place capital rules for internationally active banks. In the negotiations on the accord, the US and later the UK were ‘pace-setters’, whereas continental European countries reluctantly followed.​[33]​ This ‘divide’ in the negotiations suggests that transatlantic regulatory cooperation on the harmonisation of capital rules was limited: different members of the BCBS had different preferences, mostly rooted in the configuration of national financial systems and domestic regulatory frameworks.

In the 1980s, part of the US banking system was highly internationalised. Several big US banks operated abroad, mainly in Europe (especially in London) and had invested in South America, where they suffered heavy losses as a result of the debt crisis of the 1980s.​[34]​ Several under-capitalised US banks (see Table 1) were unable to withstand these losses and were resolved. Moreover, the US was host to subsidiaries of a number of large European and Japanese banks. The increasing market share of the (under-capitalised) Japanese banks was of particular concern for US banks and policy-makers alike, as was the concern about the (unreliable) measurement of capital positions for Japanese banks,​[35]​ as suggested by the bloated Japanese figures in Table 1, which predate the adoption of the Basel 1 definition of capital. In the late 1980s, after several bank failures, US policy-makers decided to impose higher risk-based capital requirements, which represented a cost for US banks, damaging their competitiveness vis-à-vis foreign banks that operated with lower capital.​[36]​ Hence, US policy-makers called for the introduction of risk-weighted capital standards internationally, with a view to creating a level playing field.

Like the US, the UK had been plagued by a series of domestic bank failures, the most well-known of which was that of Johnson Matthey Bankers Limited in 1984.​[37]​ Moreover, the UK hosted the subsidiaries of a large number of foreign banks, many of which were under-capitalised. Like their American counterparts, British policy-makers reacted to domestic bank failures by increasing risk-based capital requirements, which weakened the competitiveness of British banks vis-à-vis foreign competitors. Hence, British policy-makers joined US policy-makers in calling for international capital requirements.​[38]​ 

By contrast, the main European continental countries had not suffered major bank failures in the 1980s. Unlike in the US, banks provided the bulk of the credit to the real economy in all the countries of continental Europe (see Table 1). Moreover, the regulatory frameworks in place in continental countries had distinctive features including the definition of what counted as bank capital, that could not be easily taken into account in the formulation of international capital rules. Hence, France and Germany were lukewarm towards the proposed international agreement. The EU (at that time it was still the European Community) as a whole did not have its own capital rules, which varied considerably across the member states.​[39]​ There was no EU attempt to coordinate the positions of its, then, eight member states sitting in the BCBS. 

The US-UK alliance won over Japanese policy-makers. After an agreement was reached among the officials of these three countries, the other members of the BCBS reluctantly decided to join in and the Basel I accord was signed. The accord was a non-legally binding gentlemen’s agreement. Its rules became legally binding only when incorporated into the national legislation of the member countries.​[40]​ 

3.2. US-EU cooperation in bilateral regulatory relations: challenging the principle of national treatment

In the 1980s and 1990s, bilateral regulatory relations in banking were based on the principle of national treatment, whereby EU banks that wanted to operate in the US (and vice versa) were subject to the same domestic rules applied to US-headquartered banks (and vice versa). In the US, investment banking and commercial banking were separated since the Glass-Steagall Act (1933). Moreover, geographical restrictions were imposed on US banks and foreign banks operating in the US.​[41]​ Unlike in the US, ‘universal banks’​[42]​ in the EU provided a variety of financial services, such as securities trading and underwriting, in addition to traditional banking activities. Moreover, geographical restrictions in the EU had been eliminated by the First Banking directive (1977). 

Bilateral cooperation based on national treatment was unsatisfactory for the main EU member states whose banks operated in the US because EU banks operating in the US were subject to a host of restrictions, whereas US banks operating in Europe were not subject to similar restrictions. Hence, when negotiations began in 1988 on the Second Banking Directive, the large European banks operating in the US and their home member states argued that the new passport regime would provide considerable benefits to US banks operating in Europe, and therefore they expected ‘reciprocal’ treatment by US policy-makers.​[43]​ In contrast, US banks argued that European banks operating in the US should be subject to the same rules applied to US-headquartered banks.​[44]​ US policy-makers threatened retaliation to the EU’s calls for reciprocity, and the final version of the Second Banking Directive adopted did not include a clause on it.​[45]​ 

4. Intense ‘market-friendly’ transatlantic regulatory cooperation in banking in the late 1990s and mid 2000s

From the late 1990s to the outbreak of the international financial crisis, the intensity of transatlantic regulatory cooperation was high because the regulatory preferences in the US and the EU (and within the EU) were broadly aligned: both jurisdictions moved towards market-friendly regulation. Internationally, the Basel II agreement was negotiated without the deep-seated divisions between the US and the EU (or, to be precise, continental European countries) that characterised the negotiations on Basel I. Bilaterally, the US and the EU continued to apply to each other’s banks the principle of national treatment or non-discrimination. Furthermore, the Federal Reserve issued some exemptions for European banks operating in the US – it was a tentative step towards mutual recognition. 

4.1 US-EU cooperation in international ‘market-friendly’ harmonisation: Basel II

The 1990s and early 2000s were characterised by the absence of major banking crises in the US and the EU and this prolonged period of financial stability ‘empowered’ banks that called for market-friendly regulation. Several large banks that had complex risk management models in place began to lobby hard to convince policy-makers that this should be taken into account in setting (lowering, in their case) capital requirements.​[46]​ The US and UK that hosted several large cross-border banks were particularly sympathetic to this view which, however, was also widely accepted by the other BCBS members. It should also be noted that by 2003 US banks had improved their capital positions, as compared to European banks, including the UK (see Table 1).

The negotiations on Basel II, the successor of Basel I, gained momentum in June 1999, and the accord was eventually agreed in 2004. It based capital requirements on three pillars. Pillar One was concerned with minimum capital requirements, covering three types of risk: ‘credit risk’, ‘market risk’, and, innovatively, ‘operational risk’. Pillar 2 was based on a supervisory review process, aimed at covering external factors that were not fully taken into account when computing the minimum capital requirements. Finally, Pillar 3 was to be the discipline imposed by the market, facilitated by transparency requirements. 

Unlike Basel I, which was largely based on the US regulatory template, Basel II   contained a new set of rules that was not uploaded by any national jurisdiction. Whereas it partly built on Basel I, the new rules were informed by proposals and studies from large cross-border banks and banking associations, first and foremost the Institute for International Finance.​[47]​ The influence of large banks was strengthened by the fact that the BCBS had insufficient expertise and had to rely on the banks and banking associations to provide technical input into the process.​[48]​ As opposed to the negotiations on Basel I, on Basel II there was no clear cut division between the US and UK on one side and continental European countries on the other. 

Overall, the US and the EU had similar (or at least compatible) preferences, with the main exception concerning the implications of the new capital rules for the real economy and to be precise for bank credit to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In the US and to some extent in the UK, the bank-industry relationship was weak in comparison to that found in continental European countries, where banks provide the main source of funding to industry (see Table 1), especially to SMEs which produce a comparatively large part of national output in Germany, France and Italy.​[49]​ The changes that were agreed during the negotiations to the rules regarding the risk weight for lending to SMEs can largely be ascribed to the activity of the representatives from the main European countries.​[50]​ 

What accounts for the alignment of preferences across the Atlantic unlike during the previous period? The explanation is two-fold. First, although the configuration of the banking systems in the US and across the EU did not substantially change or converge over the 1990s, it was easier for regulators on both sides of the Atlantic to agree on making rules more market friendly, than it had been for them to agree on the tightening up of rules in Basel I and later on in Basel III. Moreover, secondly, the absence of major financial upheavals in developed countries in this period facilitated the convergence of national regulators towards the US-UK sponsored market-friendly approach to financial market regulation.​[51]​ Indeed, financial stability (or the absence of crisis) empowers banks. Hence decisions are mostly made on the back of the banks’ influence, which then feed into the next crisis, as explained in the following section.
 
The Basel II accord was subsequently downloaded, with some modifications, into EU legislation — the so-called Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) III (2006) — which applied to banks and investment firms of all sizes.​[52]​ In contrast, towards the end of the Basel II negotiations, US policy-makers made clear that they intended to apply Basel II rules to only 15 or so internationally active banks.​[53]​ Local community banks complained that the application of Basel II in the US would reduce capital requirements for big banks, giving them a comparative advantage vis-à-vis community banks.​[54]​ Some members of Congress shared these concerns,​[55]​ which substantially delayed the implementation of Basel II in the US.​[56]​ Hence, even though EU-US cooperation was intense during the Basel II negotiations, it weakened in the context of the domestic implementation phase in the US.

4.2 Building US-EU cooperation in bilateral regulatory relations: limited exemptions

The bilateral regulatory approach based on national treatment in the US and the EU was maintained when Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which was largely a product of a process initiated by the banks in the early 1990s of gradually probing the firewall between the different discrete sets of banking activities. The Act removed most restrictions on affiliations between commercial banks and other kinds of financial firms for both domestic and foreign banks operating in the US.​[57]​ It  also permitted a foreign bank to become a financial holding company. These changes reduced the divergence between the US and EU regulatory frameworks. Subsequently, in 2001, the Federal Reserve issued an exemption whereby a foreign bank holding company operating in the US but owned by a well-capitalised and well-managed foreign bank was not required to meet the capital requirements normally applicable to bank holding companies.​[58]​ This exemption was an important step towards mutual recognition. 

5. The conundrum of post crisis transatlantic cooperation in banking 

The international financial crisis was followed by waves of regulatory reform in the US and the EU. However, the intensity of transatlantic regulatory cooperation decreased in comparison to the pre-crisis decade because the preferences of the US and the EU were not aligned. Furthermore, within the EU, certain countries — notably the UK and Sweden — shared several preferences with the US. International harmonisation was fraught with difficulty, and the negotiations on Basel III were characterised by a division between the US and the UK on one side, and continental European countries on the other. In bilateral relations, the US and the EU backtracked on mutual recognition and some regulatory disputes emerged. Finally, transatlantic cooperation in financial (including banking) regulation was also discussed in the context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

5.1 Limited US-EU cooperation in ratcheting–up international harmonisation: Basel III

The global financial crisis brought into sharp relief the inadequacy of existing capital requirements and therefore the need to revise the content of the Basel II accord. The BCBS put forward concrete proposals in December 2009 and the final agreement was reached in September 2010. The new rules will be phased in gradually from January 2013 until 2019. The Basel III Accord built on the Basel II Accord rather than reinventing it altogether.

In the negotiations on Basel III, the ‘old’ (i.e., Basel I) divide re-emerged between the US and the UK on the one side, and continental European countries on the other.​[59]​ The US and the UK wanted a stricter definition of capital, to be limited to ordinary shares; higher capital requirements, including capital buffers; a leverage ratio; liquidity rules; and a short transition period.​[60]​ Continental countries, in particular France and Germany, wanted lower capital requirements and a broader definition of capital, including hybrids — that is, capital which has some features of both debt and equity, including silent participations (long term loans). They opposed the leverage ratio, asked for a modification of certain aspects of the liquidity rules, and pushed for a longer transition period.​[61]​ The main bone of contention was the effect that the tightening up of prudential rules for banks would have on economic growth, especially in continental countries where banks provide most of the credit to the real economy. 

As during the previous periods, the different, and at times incompatible, preferences of the US and the UK on one side and continental European countries on the other were rooted in the different configuration of their national financial systems and their domestic regulatory frameworks. Hence, crises seem to re-assert the importance of nationally embedded patterns of market organisation. The US and the UK had been badly hit by the international financial crisis. Hence policy-makers in these jurisdictions were keen to set in place measures that would avoid, or at least diminish the severity of, another crisis. Partly as a result of state capital injections (and de facto nationalisation of certain banks in the UK), UK banks and especially US banks were well positioned to meet higher capital requirements (see Table 1).​[62]​ As for the definition of capital, banks in these two countries mostly had ordinary shares, which was what US and UK policy-makers advocated for the definition of capital in Basel III. There was far less bank reliance on hybrids. The leverage ratio was already used in the US, and so were liquidity rules that the UK had unilaterally introduced in the midst of the crisis.​[63]​ 

In comparison to their US and UK counterparts, most continental European banks were less well capitalised (see Table 1). Hence they would have faced serious difficulties in meeting higher capital requirements. Many continental banks had distinctive sources of funding and did not issue equity; thus continental policy-makers called for a ‘broad’ definition of what would count as Core Tier 1 and Tier 1 capital. Indeed, hybrids, and specifically silent participations, were included in the definition of Core Tier 1 capital according to the domestic regulatory framework in several continental countries, even though they lacked the loss absorbing character of equity.​[64]​ Policy-makers in these countries resisted a leverage ratio, arguing that the risk factor of the activities of their traditional universal banks was lower than that of (largely Anglo-Saxon) investment banks​[65]​ and that this feature would not be captured by a crude leverage ratio. Continental policy-makers opposed strict liquidity rules, which was the weak spot especially of French banks which relied more heavily than most of their European competitors on short-term funding on wholesale markets.​[66]​ Finally, continental policy-makers called for a prolonged phase-in period, given their concerns about the potential impact of these measures on lending on the bank-based continental financial systems (see Table 1), where banks were the main source of finance for firms, especially for SMEs.​[67]​ 

Despite attempts by the European Commission to forge a common position, the EU presented a disjointed stance during the Basel III negotiations. As in Basel I, the EU was unable to project a common set of preferences on Basel III because crises promote divergent responses due to the re-assertion of the importance of different embedded patterns of market organisation. Unlike Basel I, in which the influence of the US and the UK was predominant, Basel III was a compromise between the positions of the two coalitions at play. In particular, continental Europeans were able to secure longer transition periods and lower capital requirements, as evidenced by the comparison of the initial document issued by the BCBS in December 2009 and the (less ambitious) document eventually agreed in December 2010.​[68]​ In the domestic implementation of the accord, the EU was criticised for not implementing Basel III properly because the CRD IV differed in several important respects from the internationally agreed standards.​[69]​ In the US, the Basel III rules were considered as a floor, not a maximum, as explained in the following section. 
 
5.2 Going its own way: US rules on foreign-owned banks 

The Dodd-Frank Act was the main regulatory response in the US to the global financial crisis​[70]​ and it substantially tightened up financial regulation in the US, also compared to the EU.​[71]​ The Act instructed the Federal Reserve to implement enhanced prudential standards for large foreign banks as well as for large domestic bank holding companies and nonbank systemically important financial institutions. The Act also extended the well-capitalized and well-managed requirements beyond US bank subsidiaries to the top-tier US and foreign holding companies.​[72]​ The so-called Collins Amendment, named after the Congressman who championed it, removed the exemption from the bank holding companies’ capital requirements granted by the Federal Reserve to foreign banks in 2001.​[73]​ Certain foreign banks, such as Barclays and Deutsche Bank, circumvented this provision by dropping the bank holding company status.​[74]​ 

The Fed responded by putting forward a proposal in December 2012 whereby foreign banks that had more than $50 billion in US assets and also exceeded that level via their non-US operations would have to place all their US subsidiaries into an intermediate holding company, a provision that challenged the established principle of national treatment. These intermediate holding companies would be expected to comply with Basel III’s capital and liquidity standards on their own terms, and would be subject to the Fed’s stress-testing regime.​[75]​ Foreign-owned banks with less than $50 billion in US assets would be required to set up intermediate holding companies, but would face less onerous regulations. 

Deutsche Bank, which was reported to need to inject $20bn into its US subsidiary Taunus to meet these requirements, complained to US policy-makers, arguing it was put at a competitive disadvantage compared to American banks that operated overseas​[76]​ The European Commission and some European policy-makers also complained to US policy-makers, arguing that the proposed rules ran counter to the principle of consolidated supervision by the home authorities, and imposed additional costs for EU banks operating in the US. Michel Barnier, the European Commissioner for the Internal Market, wrote to Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke and warned that:
 
certain elements of the ‘Foreign Banking Organizations’ Notice of Proposed Rulemaking’ … could spark a protectionist reaction from other jurisdictions.​[77]​

Despite the EU’s call for exemptions based on the principle of equivalence, in July 2013, the Federal Reserve approved a final rule on the banks’ capital framework, as part of the domestic implementation of the Basel III rules. The legislation asserted that US subsidiaries of foreign-owned banks had to comply with the US implementation of the Basel rules, whereby the US policy-makers wanted to make sure that enough capital was available in the US to deal with foreign-owned banks experiencing financial difficulties. 

Conclusion

This paper contributes to and develops further one of the main themes of the special issue​[78]​ — namely the conundrum concerning post crisis international and transatlantic regulatory cooperation in banking — by considering this cooperation from a broader long term perspective and pointing to its ebb and flow over time. The main argument put forward by this paper on the basis of the empirical record examined is that when preferences are aligned, transatlantic cooperation follows. Preferences are more aligned in times of stability and less so in times of crises, which bring to the fore the reassertion of national differences. Hence, transatlantic regulatory cooperation was intense in the 1990s and mid 2000s when — in the absence of major financial crises in the western world — US and EU preferences converged towards a ‘market-friendly’ approach, which was based on reducing regulatory constraints, following lobbying from banks. 

Transatlantic regulatory cooperation was more problematic in the aftermath of the domestic banking crises in the US and the UK in the 1980s and the international financial crisis that broke out in 2007-8, when international banking guidelines and domestic banking regulation were tightened up — the latter albeit in different ways. Hence, financial crises do not necessarily facilitate regulatory cooperation because even if national regulators might have the same objective, that is to restore financial stability (see the discussion of the regulators trilemma in Section 2), the configuration of national financial systems and their links to the real economy are different. National regulators have different preferences on the content of re-regulation after crises. 

The question then becomes what is it about banking crises that results in divergent responses? There are good reasons why we might assume that crises generate pressures for international cooperation in the regulatory response. Instead,  cooperation seems to be high during the crisis management stage​[79]​ and in the international discussions concerning the blueprint for post crisis regulatory reform (eg G 20).​[80]​ Cooperation becomes more problematic once regulatory reforms are implemented domestically because as it often happens in financial regulation, ‘the devil is in the details’. This raises the question of whether the type or character of the particular banking crisis matters. 

A ‘domestic’ crisis is likely to produce primarily a domestic response. Indeed, the domestic banking failures of the 1980s triggered a regulatory response in the US and the UK, which then set out to ‘externalise’ their new rules by uploading them internationally to the BCBS. In the case of the response to the international financial crisis, the degree of cross border externalities involved meant that cooperation was reinforced in the G 20, which ‘commissioned’ work to international financial regulatory fora (like the BCBS). The country members of the G 20 also pledged to implement its recommendations domestically. On the one hand, the scope of regulatory cooperation in finance was broadened in that regulation was extended to several previously unregulated financial activities. On the other hand, the intensity of cooperation decreased when specific rules had to be agreed in international regulatory fora, such as the BCBS and subsequently in the domestic implementation of international financial standards. Overall, crises foster divergence in national regulation because they re-assert the importance of nationally embedded patterns of market organisation – this makes cooperation more challenging, but also more necessary. 

Table 1: Large National Banking Systems, 1988, 2003 and 2009

Jurisdiction	Bank Capital to Assets ratio*	Bank Assets as a percentage of total financial assets**	Bank credit as a percentage of non-financial company external finance***
	1988	2003	2009	1987	2003	2009	1988	2003	2009
United States	6.7	9.2	12.4	36	26	20	15	11	12
Japan	11.4	3.9	3.6	54	59	52	58	47	35
United Kingdom	9.8	6.6	5.4	46	50	58	45	36	42
Germany	9.8	4.2	4.8	61	64	50	62	50	47
France	8.6	5.4	4.1	55	50	40	42	27	30
Italy	8.8	6.4	4.8	62	55	55	73	55	68
Spain	-	7.3	6.4	71	58	44	83	68	61
Netherlands	12	4.3	4.3	53	53	49	42	28	35
Sweden	9.8	5.0	5.0	40	48	40	86	65	66
*Figures from World Bank (2003, 2009). Bank capital to assets is the ratio of bank capital and reserves to total assets. Capital and reserves include funds contributed by owners, retained earnings, general and special reserves, provisions, and valuation adjustments. Capital includes tier 1 capital (paid-up shares and common stock), which is a common feature in all countries' banking systems, and total regulatory capital, which includes several specified types of subordinated debt instruments that need not be repaid if the funds are required to maintain minimum capital levels (these comprise tier 2 and tier 3 capital). Total assets include all nonfinancial and financial assets. For 1988 (with the exception of Spain) see BIS (1999) ‘Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour’, 1, 1999, Basel:  BIS, p. 7; available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp1.pdf.
**Authors’ calculations. Figures from World Bank. Only bank claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector. This figure excludes a range of bank assets (notably claims on other banks) and thus decreases the real and relative size of total bank assets. The relative figures are thus more important for the claims made in this paper. For example, the US and UK are much less bank-based than Germany and Italy.
***Authors’ calculations. EU member state figures for 2003 and 2009 are drawn from the ecb statistics data warehouse and national central bank figures; Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, December 2009 and December 2003 releases; Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistical Research and Training Institute ed. (2004, 2010); Japan Statistical Yearbook, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau; Bank of Japan;  Banque de France figures. The Bank of England/Treasury does not collect data on outstanding equity issued (only new equity issues and growth). The figures for the UK are thus based on estimates of total equity figures based on growth in equity on earlier years.
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